As the national and regional economy recovered from the "Boeing Bust" recession of the early s, air traffic at Sea-Tac began to climb at double-digit rates. The Port later joined with local cities and governments in preparing an award-winning "Sea-Tac Communities Plan" to limit and offset airport impacts on neighboring areas.
As operations exceeded this capacity measure, bad-weather delays would begin to increase dramatically, costing airlines and passengers millions of dollars annually as well as causing major inconvenience and logistical problems. Given the amount of time required for major airport development projects, this forecast sounded regional alarm bells. At the same time, the Port Commission and other local officials recognized that undertaking a major Sea-Tac expansion or construction of a major new airport demanded a regional discussion and, they hoped, consensus.
Guided by its citizen chair, Eastside developer Bob Wallace, PSATC implemented an extensive program including 26 public working sessions, six open houses, and four public hearings not counting 11 public hearings conducted by the Port Commission during the same period.
The committee began with a full menu of options including:. Ironically, in light of future controversy, the attendees at the first Flight Plan public hearings loudly endorsed expansion of Sea-Tac, and communities near alternative airports such as Paine Field quickly rallied opposition to their increased use. It would review many of the same options identified by PSATC and reach similar conclusions , with special attention to the idea of linking Sea-Tac with an existing Moses Lake airfield via a high-speed rail line through Stampede Pass.
An Environmental Impact Statement is a detailed analysis of the likely effects of a proposed plan or project, including reasonable alternatives, on the natural and social environment. The federal requirement for EIS preparation was established by the National Environmental Policy Act of , which has since been emulated by most states and local governments. On June 17, , after several public hearings, PSATC voted 29 to 6 to approve its final report without major changes, and dissolved. Based on this policy framework, on November 3, , the Port of Seattle Commission unanimously approved Resolution , which authorized a "Master Plan Update" for Sea-Tac and preparation of a new Environmental Impact Statement for its expansion.
Sensitive to local concerns engendered by the concept of a third runway at Sea-Tac, the Port launched a new public information and involvement program, including an ongoing "Sea-Tac University" to engage citizens in detailed discussion of airport plans.
These overtures did not mollify third-runway foes. The subsequent quest for a supplemental airport site pared down an initial list of 41 candidates to 19 and then to 12 before concluding there were no viable sites in the region. A related study found in July that improved "demand and system management" of existing Sea-Tac's facilities also could not effectively absorb its projected air traffic growth.
It also could not find ready alternatives to Sea-Tac expansion, but added that "the third [Sea-Tac] runway alone does not solve the region's long-term capacity problem. It proposed a new runway of up to 8, feet in length located 1, feet west of the existing second landing strip. This would require the westward extension of the airport plateau atop some 17 million cubic yards of fill dirt, to be secured on the north, south, and west by retaining walls averaging between 27 and 74 feet.
The Draft EIS identified the need to acquire about homes and cited potential effects on nearby creeks and wetlands. Among other mitigation measures, it proposed to restore about 80 acres of wetland habitat and buffer land along Miller Creek, 30 acres along Des Moines Creek, and 34 acres along Green River in Auburn, augmented by the creation of 30 acres of new wetland.
Under this plan, the Port proposed to restore or create five acres of habitat for each single acre potentially affected by the expansion. The following month, the Expert Arbitration Panel on noise abatement issued its report. The issue In response to the Expert Panel findings, the Regional Council concluded that the Port could do more to reduce noise but that its record to date was not a fatal flaw for the runway project.
Working with the Port of Seattle and a team of consultants, Hart Crowser was the principal geotechnical and hydrogeologic consultant for design, permitting, and construction of the third runway. Completing the runway involved relocating roads and utilities, and constructing three retaining walls ranging from 50 to feet high to support the new embankment and minimize wetland filling.
Walls of this height are rare—only one other retaining wall in the world is taller than feet. Computer Modeling. Hart Crowser developed the geotechnical basis of design for the walls and was responsible for verifying their stability.
Community leaders were vociferous in their opposition to the proposed third runway at Sea-Tac, fearing that the noise, pollution and traffic would wreck their cities. It was an ugly debate on both sides. The angst was more than just the specter of a third runway. The Port of Seattle — which operates the airport — treated runway opponents with disdain. Politically, their major misstep was their decision to ignore history: SeaTac and Federal Way voted to incorporate as cities in Burien followed three years later.
Prior to incorporation, those areas were part of unincorporated King County, which treated them as a dumping ground for tacky multifamily development. We know today that there will be no fourth runway at Sea-Tac, which is among the smallest international airports in the nation.
That means another regional airport, and siting it and determining its function is no small task. The stakeholders involved in this debate go way beyond individuals worried about jet noise: They are municipalities and major corporate entities with significant business interests. Editor's Note.
0コメント